Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Dean W. Crowther v. Bryan Mower : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Verl C. Ritchie; Attorney for Appellee.
Bryan D. Mower; Pro Se.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Dean W. Crowther v. Bryan Mower, No. 930446 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5359

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
tifiiEF

DEAN W. CROWTHER
UTAH
'.
KHJ
60

Paintiff and
Appellee,
vs.

JT

.A ">Q

DOCKET NO.

BRYAN MOWER

°i*>(mb

Court of Appeals #930446-CA
PRIORITY 15

Defendant and
Appellant

REPLY TO
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
in Summit County, State of Utah.
The Honorable David S. Young, Judge.

Bryan D. Mower
#5 Quietwood Ln.
Sandy, UT 84092
Pro Se Defendant/Appellant
Verl C. Ritchie(#2761)
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

„ FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

OCT 2 7 1993

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DEAN W. CROWTHER
Paintiff and
Appellee,

:

vs.

:

BRYAN MOWER

Court of Appeals #930446-CA

Defendant and
Appellant

:
:

PRIORITY 15

REPLY TO
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
in Summit County, State of Utah.
The Honorable David S. Young, Judge.

Bryan D. Mower
#5 Quietwood Ln.
Sandy, UT 84092
Pro Se Defendant/Appellant
Verl C. Ritchie(#2761)
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OR AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

STATEMENT OF CASE

2

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
2
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS IMPROPER WHEN A DISPUTE TO A
MATERIAL FACT EXISTS
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
4
A DEED NOT RECORDED DOES NOT EFFECT THE VALIDITY
OF THE CONVEYANCE
CONCLUSION

5

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Horton v. Horton 695 P. d 102, 106 (Utah 1984)

4

Poulson v. Poulson 672 P. d 97,99 (Utah 1983)

4

Salt Lake City Corp v. James Constructors Inc.,
761 P. d 42 (Utah Cr. App. 1988)

3

Statutes
23 Am Jur d. Deeds Sec. 76 et seq

4

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEAN W. CROWTHER,
Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
Utah Court of Appeals #930446-CA
BRYAN MOWER,
PRIORITY 15

Defendant-Appellant
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nriiTrroirnn
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Statement of the Issues
1.

Whether appellee has effectively defended the position that the court erred by granting

appellee's motion for summary judgment when there was clearly a material factual dispute as
to whether appellant's mother intended to presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she sent
via certified mail from Utah to appellant while he was in California, and that such deed was
on its face an absolute conveyance.
2.

Whether appellee has defended that the trial court erred by summarily ruling that a
1

deed not recorded by grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest
in the property that is the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship until the deed is recorded.
3.

Whether the appellee has defended that the trial court erred by granting appellee

attorney's fees even though appellant was named as the defendant in appellee's action to quiet
title, and appellant merely showed up in court to argue why appellant's deed, conveyed from
his mother to him was valid, and appellant made this argument in good faith and defended it
very well by both fact and in law.
Statement of Case
In appellee's statement of the case in his brief, page 4 and 5, the statements are made
that: appellant's "answer and defense was knowingly not well-grounded in fact or warranted
by existing law and lacks good faith...[appellant's] documents are largely unintelligible and
contain erroneous legal half-truths, none of which are well grounded in fact or warranted by
existing law. " It is the contention of this reply that appellee has not provided one case or one
statute supporting his positions. In fact, all appellee has done is present opinions
unsubstantiated by law.
Detail of Argument
Summary Judgment is Improper When a Dispute to a Material Fact Exists

The appellee stated that "it is fundamental that summary judgment should be granted
where there is 'no genuine issue as to any material fact."' Clearly there is an issue of fact in
this case and the granting of the summary judgment in favor of the appellee, turned on an
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issue of fact, not law., therefore, the granting of the motion for summary judgment should be
overruled because in order for a nonmoving party to successfully oppose a motion for
summary judgment and send the issue to a factfinder, it is not necessary for the party to
prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the nonmoving party to show facts that
controvert those of the moving party's* Salt Lake City Corp v. James Constructors Inc., 761
P. d 42 (Utah Cr. App. 1988).
The appellee also stated that "the controlling, undisputed facts in this case revolve
around the letter of W. Paul Wharton, (Mrs. Crowther's Attorney) dated December 16, 1988.
Appellee is incorrect in this opinion. The controlling, undisputed fact in this case is the deed
itself, which is a "Legally Binding Contract" that was signed by Mrs. Crowther on December
15, 1988, witnessed, notarized and sent via certified mail to Mr. Mower which at that time,
according to the law (see appellant's brief), severed Mrs. Crowther's joint tenancy with
appellee. Appellant had become a tenant in common with appellee when he was conveyed
the property, two and 1/2 years before Nellie Crowther died.
Other controlling, facts in this case include the letter mention by appellee which
indicates Mrs. Crowther's intention: "I (Mr. Wharton) am forwarding the two deeds to you, to
complete the transaction by which she (Mrs. Crowther) transfers ownership to you (Mr.
Mower). "; and the codicil to the will in which Mrs. Crowther states: "I have by quit-claim
deed, given to my son (Mr. Mower) one-half of my home and other real property."
These are clearly controlling facts that indicate a clear intention to sever joint tenancy with
Mr. Crowther and convey interest to appellant.
The Supreme Court of Utah, on at least two occasions, has clearly stated that a
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grantor's intent to deliver a deed is not one of law, rather one of fact. In Horton v.
Horton, 695 P.d 102, 106 (Utah 1984) the Court ruled: Delivery or its absence is a question
of fact."

See also: Poulson v. Poulson, 672 Rd 97, 99 (Utah 1983). In light of these rulings

by the Utah Supreme Court, the trial judge was clearly wrong by granting summary judgment
on the factual issue concerning Nellie Crowther's intent to transfer ownership when she
conveyed her property to her son, Mr. Mower.

A Deed Not Recorded by a Grantee Does Not Effect the
Validity of the Conveyance Between the Grantor and the Grantee

Appellee state on page 7 of appellee's brief that "the failure to record the deed for
some two and one half years is fatal to appellant's case." However, appellee fails to provided
case law or statutes to support his opinion. Appellant has supplied over 11 cases and a statute
(see appellant's brief page 12-19) indicating that recording adds nothing to a deed's
effectiveness as a conveyance; all that it accomplishes is to impart notice and after its
acceptance, failure to record the deed will not revest title in the grantor. ( 23 Am Jur d,
Deeds sections 76 et seq.)
Appellant, by law, was a tenant in common with appellee as of December 15, 1988
and had the option to record or "serve notice of his claim" any time he chose. Appellee has
not supplied any documents thus far including case law or statutes supporting his opinion.
Appellee claimed that appellant has not filed an affidavit of impecuniosity and by
failing to do so, has violated rule 11 and rule 40(a), U.R. App. P. Appellant asserts that all
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documents filed are legal and responsible and appellant has acted in his own behalf quite well
utilizing the standard of law, procedure and protocol in all aspects of the case. In addition,
appellant's actions were not frivolous and, by all standards, meritorious.
Conclusion
The attorney's fees granted originally, were an abuse of discretion because Mr.
Mower's defense was asserted in good faith and was well grounded in both fact and law.
Appellant should, therefore, prevail on all issues presented and this court should give full
force and effect to all provisions dpthe Utah Laws, cited in appellant's brief and reverse the
District Court's original decision.
Respectfti^ Submitted,

•A
Bryan D. Mower
Pro Se
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